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COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE,  
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
BY SAMUEL COURTNEY1 
 
The fundamental question this paper seeks to address is whether religious 
free exercise constitutional interests should supersede copyright and fair use 
doctrine. The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Worldwide Church of God v. 
Philadelphia Church of God raised interesting issues on whether the 
copyright defense of fair use may properly be applied to religious free 
exercise constitutional interests.2 This decision will have a significant impact 
on religious sects that choose to break off from a larger religious organization 
and whether they are subject to liability for infringing on the religious 
doctrine of the original organization. In cases where this issue comes before 
a judge, copyright law may demand that a court determine the most important 
part of a work or even whether a work is fact or fiction. While the court must 
adhere to these principles in making its decision, it should also refrain from 
making subjective judgments on the inherent value or truthfulness of a 
particular faith. The United States prides itself on the separation of church 
and state, and we generally believe that a court or judge is not the proper 
authority to determine the goodness or truthfulness of our religious beliefs.  
 
Copyright infringement cases involving religious doctrine, however, 
simultaneously ask courts to determine which sections of religious doctrine 
are the most significant, whether the work is factual, and, perhaps most 
difficult and subject to judicial restraint, who authored the religious text. The 
question of religious fair use is also particularly tricky because religious 
organizations are typically seeking recruitment and membership growth, not 
necessarily commercial monetary gain. These fair use principles clash with 
constitutional religious free exercise interests, and this tension appears to be 
an issue that will be raised in court for years to come. 
 
This paper argues that constitutional free exercise considerations should not 
supersede neutral copyright doctrine, and that the policy underlying the fair 
                                                                 
1 Samuel Courtney, J.D., University of St. Thomas, School of Law, 2019. The author is very 
appreciative to Professor Thomas Berg for his input and counsel with this Note.   
2
 Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
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use defense is an important value that should be upheld in religious copyright 
cases. 
 
I. RELIGIOUS COPYRIGHT OVERVIEW 
 
United States copyright law protects original works fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.3 Works of authorship cover the following categories: 
literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and architectural 
works.4 The copyright owner of a work has the following exclusive rights: to 
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale, to perform the work publicly, and in the case of sound recordings, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.5 A showing of a direct infringement of any of these exclusive 
rights does not turn on intent or negligence; the infringer is strictly liable. 
 
One can anticipate that many, if not all, of these exclusive rights may be 
relevant to or litigated by a religious organization. Religious organizations 
are in the “business” of distributing, reproducing, and performing, by way of 
sermon, their scripture and religious text.6 Interestingly, Congress included a 
section within the limitations on these rights to exclude performance of a 
nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-musical work of a 
religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of 
worship or other religious assembly.7 We will see later in the discussion of 
the fair use defense that showing a commercial harm or harm on the potential 
market for the copyright holder is a crucial factor in determining whether a 
use is fair. 
 
In cases of religious intellectual property disputes, copyright protections 
most often involve religious text or scripture. Because most faiths have 
scripture that they believe was authored by a divine figure, the infringing of 
their religious text is extremely important to the reputation and pride of a 
religious organization. Misappropriation or infringement of scripture is an 
                                                                 
3 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
4 Id. 
5
 Id. § 106(1-6).   
6
 Here the word “business” is in quotes due to the question of the non -commercial nature of faith. 
7
 Id. § 110(3). 
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often-litigated issue, for example, by the church of Scientology.8 It is also the 
basis of the Worldwide Ninth Circuit case where a religious sect broke off 
from its organization and published, distributed, and preached on the 
identical religious scripture of the larger organization.9 This type of dispute 
is the primary category of religious copyright litigation. 
 
The most relevant and persuasive defense in cases of religious scripture 
infringement is the doctrine of fair use. Fair use is a limitation of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder.10 This limitation allows for 
reproduction of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright 
owner for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, or research.11 There are four factors to be considered in 
determining whether use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work (is it 
transformative?); (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.12  
 
The general policy idea behind fair use is similar to that behind the First 
Amendment; we want to be able to criticize and comment on speech and 
written works without being subject to legal liability. This is good policy and 
exemplifies the American ideals of freedom to speak your mind and have 
open-forum debate without the fear of government intervention or private 
litigation. Fred von Lohmann argues that the doctrine of fair use allows 
United States industry pioneers such as Apple to innovate in areas of 
technology without fear of copyright legal liability: “[t]here would be no iPod 
if Apple could not count on copyright law to permit iPod buyers to copy their 
existing CD collections…there would be no TiVo but for the ability of 
consumers to copy programming from broadcast, cable, and satellite 
television.13  
 
This logic also applies to new religious organizations. Fair use arguably 
allows dissatisfied members of a religious organization to use the same 
scripture in a new organization that they believe more closely conforms to 
                                                                 
8
 Wired Staff, Scientology: The Web’s First Copyright-Wielding Nemesis, WIRED (Sept. 21, 2009, 
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/mf-chanology-sidebar/. 
9
 227 F.3d 1110. 
10
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).  
11
 Id. § 107 (1-4). 
12
 Id.  
13
 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY T ECH. L.J. 829, 837 (2008).  
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the teaching of that scripture. This fair use defense is the primary argument 
of defendants in religious copyright cases. 
 
The most persuasive counterargument against fair use in religious copyright 
infringement cases is that while we want to permit fair commentary and 
criticism, we do not want to permit direct infringement of a work simply to 
profit off of the time, energy, and creativity spent by the original author. 
There may be a question as to whether a church seeking new members is a 
“commercial benefit” but the idea of directly copying religious scripture 
verbatim and profiting one way or another is generally not fondly looked 
upon in the United States. This was the argument of the Satanist temple in a 
recently filed complaint, as well as Worldwide Church of God in the 
significant Ninth Circuit case. 
 
It is also important to note that because United States copyright doctrine is 
federal law, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) applies to 
these proceedings. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act was enacted 
in 1993, and states that Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, with the exception of the compelling interest/least restrictive 
means test. This Act set a new course for religious freedom litigation. Prior 
to RFRA, the Supreme Court of the United States in Employment Division v. 
Smith held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.”14 
RFRA added the neutral and general applicability test and requires that the 
government not substantially burden religious exercise, unless there is a 
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling government interest.15  
 
RFRA currently applies only to federal law, and thus applies to copyright and 
fair use doctrine. Without RFRA, the accuser would likely succeed easily 
under the theory that the Copyright Act is a neutral and generally applicable 
law not specifically targeting any one religion and therefore the infringing 
religious organization’s free exercise is not being violated. As it stands now, 
the accuser faces more of an uphill battle proving a compelling government 
interest to protect their copyright. 
 
                                                                 
14
 Employment Div., Dep't  of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)).  
15
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b)(1, 2) (1993).  
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A. Importance of protecting religious copyright interests 
 
Protecting the copyright of its scriptures is extremely important to religious 
organizations. This is important to emphasize because it not only shows how 
far religious organizations are willing to go to protect their intellectual 
property, but it also shows that a court may be looking at these issues when 
determining whether there is a commercial loss or harm on their potential 
market. The Church of Scientology is the most extreme example of how far 
churches are willing to go to protect their copyright. 
 
The Church of Scientology views protecting their intellectual property as 
protecting the rights of all internet users: “The Church has taken legal action 
to protect Scientology intellectual properties from unauthorized copying and 
distribution, resulting in landmark legal precedents that secure and preserve 
the freedoms and legal rights of all who travel the information 
superhighway.”16 Whether or not the strong language here is true, it is evident 
that the Church believes that protecting their copyright and intellectual 
property is crucial to the potential success of their congregation. Reports 
from news organizations have shown that the Church “scours the Net for 
alleged copyright and trademark violations.”17 The Church of Scientology 
has also hired private investigators to look into “Rathburn’s [former member] 
appropriation of the Church’s intellectual property, his threat to destroy its 
copyrights, his exhortations to others to engage in theft of Church materials 
and property and his public attacks upon Scientology and its officials.”18 The 
Church of Scientology may be an anomaly in terms of its “scouring,” yet it 
is still evident how important protecting religious scripture can be for major 
religious organizations.19  
The Satanic Temple (TST) is another example of a religious organization that 
takes legal measures to protect its copyright. In a recently filed complaint in 
the Southern District of New York, TST alleged that “the Netflix television 
series known as the Chilling Adventures of Sabrina benefited from and 
                                                                 
16 What Has Been the Church’s Role in Protecting Free Speech and Intellectual Property Rights 
on the Internet?, SCIENTOLOGY NEWSROOM, https://www.scientologynews.org/faq/what -has-
been-the-church-role-in-protecting-internet-free-speech.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
17
 Scientologists in Trademark Disputes, CNET (Jan. 29, 1998), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/scientologists-in-trademark-disputes/. 
18
 Scientology Takes Aim at “Going Clear” Documentary, NBC News (March 20, 2015, 8:59 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/scientology-takes-aim-going-clear-documentary-
n325256. 
19
 Scientology also has other lit igation concerns over its “auditing” materials, which should not be 
compared to its religious scriptures. This is more of an economic concern than a religious freedom 
issue, and the distinction is important. 
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defamed TST’s unique original expression of the historic Baphomet, an 
androgynous goat-headed deity.”20 The Baphomet was an original sketch 
made in the 1800’s, which TST argues it modified and transformed into a 
statue to include children and several other original details, which constituted 
TST as the copyright owner of those modifications.21 For example, TST 
argues that the children were strategically placed in the model to find a 
“specific expression of bi-racial childlike innocence by children of different 
races, looking up in reverence at the Baphomet.”22 Additionally, TST claims 
that that it made specific detail changes from the original sketch such as the 
angle of the Baphomet’s arms, softening the eyes of the Baphomet so as to 
imply wisdom, and the clothing design on the children.23 Finally, TST 
believes that their version of the Baphomet was not only an original 
modification for which they own the copyright, but that extensive publicity 
has made their specific statue and its changes a famous symbol of the TST.24  
 
The Netflix series Chilling Adventures of Sabrina depicts the Baphomet, TST 
argues, in conformity with an evil antagonist and misappropriates the TST 
Baphomet to publish a false and defamatory depiction.25 TST argues that 
comments from the series’ producer show that they knew about the 
modifications attributed to the creativity of TST, specifically that the TST 
statue was the only depiction, which included children and a male chest 
instead of the original sketch, which included female breasts.26  
 
TST is seeking $50 million in damages, no doubt looking to send a message 
that their deity figure is not to be freely copied.27 This is another example of 
how religious organizations take their intellectual property seriously and why 
this litigation is only in its early stages. The public controversy and potential 
damaging reputation of being a litigious organization appears to be less 
significant than protecting the reputation and pride of the church’s 
intellectual property. 
 
                                                                 
20
 Complaint at 1, United Federation of Churches LLC d/b/a The Satanic Temple v. Netflix, Inc. 
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10372 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Netflix-Satanic-Temple.pdf.  
21 Id. at  3. 
22 Id. at 8.  
23
 Id.  
24
 Id. 
25 Complaint at 3, United Federation of Churches LLC d/b/a The Satanic Temple v. Netflix, Inc. 
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10372 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Netflix-Satanic-Temple.pdf. 
26 Id. at  13.  
27
 Id. at 6.  
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B. Divine Authorship 
 
A fascinating issue surrounding religious copyright disputes is the matter of 
authorship. To hold a copyright in the United States, you must be the author 
of an original work fixed in a tangible medium (or otherwise have a license 
or authority to use the work).28 Authorship is not often a difficult hurdle to 
cross; the parties in a copyright suit generally stipulate to the matter of 
authorship, unless there is some question of joint authorship or licensing 
agreement. In the case of most religious disputes, however, the plaintiff 
organization believes that their scripture was authored by God or a divine 
figure. The obvious question then is who can have ownership to scripture 
written by God? In the case of Scientology, the answer is easy. L. Ron 
Hubbard authored all of the Church of Scientology’s scripture, and he (now 
his estate) is the obvious copyright owner of the scripture.29 
 
In the matter of more widely followed faiths, the question isn’t quite as 
simple. Without researching or looking into this issue, one might believe that 
no organization or person has standing in court to sue on behalf of, for 
example, the Christian Bible as its copyright owner. While this may be an 
entertaining dinner table debate for lawyers, the U.S. Copyright Office has 
answered the question in its Compendium of Practices. The third edition of 
the compendium provides a “Human Authorship Requirement,” and 
specifically excludes worked alleged to be created by a divine being.30  
 
To have standing in court, religious organizations must show that they made 
some sort of original modification to the scripture. By admitting this to the 
court, are they not simultaneously admitting to their congregation that the 
scripture they teach is not authored by God and is instead the product of 
human intervention? In some cases, groups may claim that God inspired the 
authors of the scripture but that they used human characteristics to complete 
the product. In this case, it should be clear that the copyright belongs to the 
human author. Merely being inspired by the divine does not attribute the 
credit to God. The copyright should be owned by the human that put the 
inspiration to paper and created the work. The Church could also argue that 
it merely translated the work from another language or added some original 
                                                                 
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
29
 History.com Editors, L. Ron Hubbard Publishes Dianetics, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018) 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/l-ron-hubbard-publishes-dianetics. 
30
 Jarrod Welsh, Copyrighting God: New Copyright Guidelines Do Not Protect Divine Beings, 17 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 121, 121–22 (2015). 
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commentary so that their congregations could more easily understand the 
teachings of the divine scripture, but it is nevertheless a tricky issue. 
 
Another answer is that most religious scriptures were created prior to 1923 
and are therefore in the public domain.31 Literary works in the public domain 
no longer have a copyright owner. They are owned by the public and anyone 
can use them, save for a few exceptions like the “complete collections” 
exception where one may have used creativity in putting together a collection 
of works in the public domain for a commercial purpose. Translations and 
commentary to works in the public domain constitute protectable copyright, 
because the freedom to make new works based on public domain materials 
ends where the resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a valid 
copyright (in this case, the translation or commentary).32 
 
The question of authorship appears to be answered in religious copyright 
cases, but still presents an interesting situation for religious organizations 
who profess their scriptures to be the work of God or a divine figure. 
 
II. ARE CONSTITUTIONAL FREE EXERCISE INTERESTS 
PROTECTED BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COPYRIGHT 
DOCTRINE? 
 
When a group of members become dissatisfied with the direction of the 
organization and break off into their own sect, the intellectual property of the 
organization becomes necessary for the new group to freely exercise their 
religious practices. Such disputes are becoming more frequent in religious 
free exercise litigation. No case models this situation more closely than the 
Ninth Circuit’s Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God.33  
 
 
A. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God 
 
Before founding the Worldwide Church of God, Herbert Armstrong grew up 
in poverty, and began his career as a writer at a local Des Moines 
newspaper.34 He later founded the Radio Church of God, renamed to 
                                                                 
31
 Rich Stim, Welcome to the Public Domain , Stanford Univ. Libraries (Oct. 2010) 
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/.  
32
 Warner Bros. Entm't v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011). 
33
 227 F.3d 1110. 
34
 Herbert W. Armstrong: An Unofficial Ambassador for World Peace , Phila. Church of God, 
https://www.pcog.org/about/herbert -armstrong. 
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Worldwide Church of God (WCG), in 1934.35 He wrote the Church’s 
scripture, Mystery of Ages (MOA), between 1984 and 1985.36 He distributed 
this religious scripture in The Plain Truth magazine free of charge to millions 
to people.37 While religious organizations want to protect their intellectual 
property, they also want to distribute their text on a wide scale. These two 
interests come into conflict with one another in cases like Worldwide because 
the group breaking off from the larger organization may not use the widely 
distributed text to the organization’s liking. This results in 
“misappropriation” and infringement lawsuits. 
 
After Armstrong’s death his estate bequeathed his intellectual property rights 
to the church and the church chose to discontinue distribution of the MOA 
for views that they believed were outdated.38 Examples of these outdated 
views include ideas expressed regarding divorce, remarriage, and divine 
healing.39 The Advisory Council of Elders believed that the MOA also 
contained outdated views that were racist in nature and stopped distributing 
the MOA because of “cultural standards of social sensitivity.”40 Two former 
members, Gerald Flurry and John Amos, later founded a new religious 
organization, Philadelphia Church of God (PCG), which asserted that the 
MOA was to be taken as true religious doctrine, and used the text as required 
reading for all members.41 WCG and PCG stipulated to the fact that PCG 
copied the MOA verbatim, outside of a “suggested reading” section and a 
warning against reproduction.42 WCG sent a demand to PCG that it cease 
infringing its copyright, and PCG ignored the demand.43 
 
 
WCG filed a copyright infringement suit against PCG, alleging that PCG was 
“reproducing, distributing, promoting, advertising, and offering unlawful and 
unauthorized copies of the MOA.”44 At the district court level, the court 
denied a summary judgment motion by WCG and granted PCG’s motion for 
summary judgment.45 In just two paragraphs, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
                                                                 
35 227 F.3d at 1113.  
36
 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. 
41 Worldwide Church of God, 27 F.3d at 1113.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45
 Id. at 1114.  
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that WCG was the proper and valid owner of the copyright to the MOA.46 
PCG argued that Armstrong granted a nonexclusive, implied license for 
MOA for those who value its religious message, but the court held that there 
was not enough evidence to show Armstrong intended to create the MOA for 
dissemination by third parties.47  
 
The issue of ownership in this case is interesting because WCG was 
attempting to distance itself from what appears to be significant values 
described in Armstrong’s scripture. If Armstrong were alive to see this 
dispute, he might very well prefer, as the copyright owner, to grant a license 
or permission to the group that was sticking to the core tenets of his teachings 
rather than the organization that labeled his views as “outdated.” He may 
have even disavowed the WCG and cited them for infringement if they 
continued using their makeshift version of his scripture. As it stands, 
however, the Ninth Circuit was correct in determining that WCG had proper 
ownership of the MOA. 
 
The far more controversial issue arising in this case is whether PCG’s use of 
the MOA was fair as an exception to the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner. The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of a Seventh Circuit case in 
which the court held that the copyright owner may “prevent churches from 
copying or publishing its copyrighted works, even if the churches only intend 
to use the copies or publications at not-for-profit religious services.”48 This 
reasoning is sound, because churches may “profit” in the form of recruitment 
and membership services the same way that a business may commercially 
benefit from copyright infringement.  
 
It would not be good policy to allow religious organizations to freely infringe 
on the copyright of others merely because they are a non-profit organization. 
The idea of the copyright owner being able to utilize their exclusive rights 
should not be thrown by the wayside for churches. This principle is important 
for reasons outside of monetary gain. The copyright holder may want to 
strictly control the reputation of their work and not allow certain 
organizations to be associated with the copyright holder. That should 
absolutely be within the prerogative of the owner. There will be further 
religious free exercise arguments that are more compelling, but the non-profit 
nature of churches should not escape copyright doctrine. 
                                                                 
46 Id.  
47
 Id.  
48
 F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 19198 (7th Cir. 
Mar. 25, 1982). 
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The court also briefly analyzed this issue from a First Amendment free 
speech perspective. They cited a Second Circuit case, which noted that “the 
public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal 
to recognize a valid copyright in facts.”49 This issue will be discussed further 
in the section on judicial restraint, but it is important to note that the court is 
essentially saying that the MOA is not a scripture of fact, but is rather the 
product of original creativity that may validly be protected as copyright and 
not as a collection of facts. If the court did believe that this was a book of 
facts, the First Amendment issue may be worth a second look because facts 
are generally not subject to copyright. As it stands, the Ninth Circuit believed 
that the MOA was sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection and 
that right is not limited by First Amendment free speech concerns. 
 
All four factors of fair use in this case were discussed and are worth 
analyzing. Fair use in this case was a close question, but PCG’s failure to 
provide any additional commentary or original modification to the MOA 
prevents a fair use defense.  
 
The first factor of fair use is the purpose and character of the use.50 In other 
words, was the use for commercial purposes or for educational means? 
Generally, evidence of commercial gain turns against fair use when the 
infringer is clearly profiting off the copyright of another. This factor is more 
difficult in this case because the definition of “commercial gain” is not clear. 
The Supreme Court of the United States broadly defined noncommercial use 
in its Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios opinion: “A challenge 
to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the 
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual 
present harm need not be shown.”51 Harm to the potential market of WCG 
will be discussed further with the fourth fair use factor, but it seems clear 
from this Supreme Court holding that WCG must be able to show that PCG’s 
use of their copyrighted work is harmful, not necessarily that they are losing 
money. 
 
                                                                 
49 227 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 
57, 61 (2d Cir.1980)). 
50
 17 U.S. Code § 107 (1) (1992). 
51
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).  
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A more recent Supreme Court opinion held that the first factor also turns on 
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation 
or instead adds something new…and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative’.”52 The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that while a showing 
of transformative use is not absolutely necessary under Campbell, in this case 
there is no question that PCG copied the MOA verbatim and did not attempt 
to make any such transformation or original modification.53 PCG may also 
argue that they are putting the work in a new context, and therefore are adding 
some original content to the work. The court would not likely side with PCG, 
however, because the context in which PCG is using the MOA is the same as 
it was used by WCG. The only difference now is that MOA no longer wishes 
to exercise their right to perform or distribute the work. 
 
 PCG also argued that its use was not for a commercial purpose or for profit. 
The court reasoned that the absence of a commercial use merely eliminates 
the presumption of unfairness.54 There is an argument, however, that PCG 
does financially gain from their copying. During the time of their use of the 
MOA, PCG’s membership grew to seven thousand members, who tithe ten 
percent of their income.55 The court therefore ruled that the first factor 
weighed against fair use in this case. 
 
The second factor of fair use is the nature of the copyrighted work.56 This is 
probably the weakest factor for PCG, as the work is undoubtedly creative and 
not informational. The court reasoned that “while it may be viewed as 
‘factual’ by readers who share Armstrong’s religious beliefs, the creativity, 
imagination, and originality embodied in MOA tilt the scale against fair 
use.”57 The only possible argument for PCG here is that the court should 
show restraint in determining whether the MOA is a work of fact or 
creativity. This is not an argument that appears to have been made or 
discussed by the court, but the opinion does seem to suggest that the MOA is 
not a work of fact. At the very least, it determined that there is enough 
creativity in the MOA to turn against fair use and against its use as a factual, 
informational guide. 
 
                                                                 
52
 Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579(1994).  
53 227 F.3d at 1117. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56
 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1992). 
57
 Id.  
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The third factor of fair use is the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.58 In this case, PCG 
copied the entirety of the MOA save for a page or two. The court stressed 
that copying an entire work “militates against a finding of fair use.”59 In 
almost all non-religious cases, the analysis would stop there. PCG argued, 
however, that its copying was reasonable because the MOA is religious in 
nature.60 The court did not find merit to this argument and cited a previous 
Ninth Circuit case which reasoned that copying and using a work for the same 
purpose as the owner is a strong indication against fair use.61 Here, PCG’s 
purpose of using the MOA is the same purpose as WCG; to recruit members 
and raise charitable funds for the use of the religious organization. The court 
held that a “reasonable person would expect PCG to pay WCG for the right 
to copy and distribute MOA created by WCG with its resources.”62 
 
 The fourth factor is the effect of the use upon the potential market for the 
value of the copyrighted work.63 In accordance with the policy of allowing 
criticism, effect on the market must come from exhaustion of the demand, 
not from criticism of the work.64 PCG and WCG are not seeking a typical 
commercial market, but rather a market of membership and donations. 
Additionally, because WCG no longer agrees with the teachings of the MOA, 
aren’t PCG and WCG merely competing in the market of ideas, not the same 
religious market? The court correctly reasons that “[r]eligious, educational 
and other public institutions would suffer if their publications invested with 
an institution’s reputation and goodwill could be freely appropriated by 
anyone.”65 If the purpose behind protecting copyright is to allow the owner 
to control the associations and reputation of their work, outside of preventing 
commentary and criticism, then it makes sense that a rival organization 
should not be able to freely appropriate that work with the goal of recruiting 
the same potential members. The court also noted that WCG planned on 
creating an annotated version of the MOA, which harms the potential of such 
a venture if PCG was to freely distribute the original copy.66  
 
A compelling counterargument to this note is that an annotated copy would 
itself be an original modification and an entirely separate copyrighted work. 
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PCG’s use of the original MOA would not dissuade a potential customer 
from instead purchasing the WCG’s annotated version. That customer may 
very well agree with WCG that the original views of Herbert Armstrong are 
outdated and would prefer an annotated copy of the MOA to reflect more 
socially progressive ideas. Additionally, PCG is the one making the pitch and 
persuading new members to join their organization, not necessarily the MOA 
alone. If WCG weren’t planning its own annotated copy, then PCG could 
make a persuasive argument that there is no longer an exhaustion of demand, 
but they are now instead competing in the marketplace of ideas since WCG 
no longer believes in the teachings of the MOA. If the MOA scripture alone 
is not persuading the potential market, then the market demand has not been 
exhausted as a result of PCG’s use. 
 
PCG could also make the argument that because WCG no longer has an 
interest in distributing the original MOA, it is holding the original Armstrong 
teachings hostage under the shield of copyright law. Therefore, under RFRA, 
they are substantially burdened from practicing their faith without being able 
to orally reproduce or read the scriptures in the MOA. I will discuss the 
RFRA argument in more detail below. 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court ultimately did not buy the argument from PCG that 
the MOA no longer had market value to WCG.67 The court reasoned that the 
author’s decision not to use his copyright does not mean that they are no 
longer entitled to protection of the copyright.68 Additionally, WCG planned 
on distributing an annotated version of the MOA, so the argument that WCG 
had completely abandoned their rights was not fruitful. 
I agree with the court’s decision that fair use does not favor PCG. While I 
recognize the harm to PCG in that they cannot continue to use the religious 
text on which their faith is based, there was nothing to stop PCG from 
creating their own modification or annotated copy of the MOA for its own 
recruitment and membership purposes. They could have created a new copy 
of the MOA in which they discussed why they believed modifying the MOA 
to conform with societal trends was wrong and why they believed WCG was 
moving in the wrong direction. Such a modification to the MOA would likely 
have been fair use because it would have been a commentary on the original 
copy while PCG could also maintain to its members that the original 
foundation of the scriptures was the proper reading of their faith.  
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The only protectable practice in this case was PCG’s public performance 
(sermons) and educational Sunday school teachings from the MOA. In the 
case of religious performance, however, it is difficult to perform a sermon or 
religious teaching without the scripture, and PCG was likely reading from 
the protected scripture as part of its performance. The members of the church 
are also likely following along with the text. The first factor, purpose and 
character of the use, favors PCG in the case where they are reading the MOA 
or teaching the MOA for educational purposes. Additionally, Section 110 on 
the limitations on exclusive rights has a section which excludes the 
performance of a “nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-
musical work of a religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of 
services at a place of worship or other religious assembly.”69 If PCG was 
merely preaching about the teachings of the MOA or teaching a Sunday 
School class about Herbert Armstrong’s core religious doctrines, then 
Section 110 would likely have allowed for this use. Distributing the scripture 
for gain in the market of recruitment, however, is not an educational purpose 
or performance and almost certainly harms the potential market of WCG. 
Therefore, I believe the court’s fair use finding was missing some analysis 
but was ultimately decided correctly. 
 
The final consideration in this case was PCG’s contention that preventing 
their congregation from using the MOA would amount to a violation of 
RFRA.70 As discussed earlier, RFRA provides that “Government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability.”71 PCG argued that an injunction 
preventing them from using the MOA would substantially burden a “central 
tenet of its religious doctrine, namely, distribution of MOA to current and 
potential adherents of its church.”72 The court acknowledged that whether 
RFRA can be extended to the copyright doctrine is an unresolved and open 
issue, but ultimately dodged the issue.73 The Ninth Circuit came to that 
conclusion because PCG failed to take any steps in seeking a license or 
negotiating with WCG to come to an agreement that would allow them to co-
exist.74 Therefore, the court did not believe that PCG had shown that it was 
being subjected to a substantial burden.75 
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While the Ninth Circuit did opine in one sentence as to whether RFRA should 
override copyright doctrine, it did not rule on this “knotty” question.76 The 
court merely speculated that it is unlikely that Congress meant for RFRA 
legislation to include “the protection of intellectual property rights against 
unauthorized appropriation.”77 Unfortunately, this is the only bit of analysis 
we got on the issue, but it appears the Ninth Circuit is unlikely to override 
copyright law with RFRA arguments. 
 
If the court was sufficiently convinced that a restriction on the use of 
copyrighted religious doctrine was a substantial burden to the defendant, it 
would have had to analyze whether copyright law and fair use passes the 
strict scrutiny test contained within RFRA.78 Once it has been established 
that there is a substantial burden, the first test of RFRA’s strict scrutiny 
requirement is whether the government has a compelling interest in 
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion.79 In this case, WCG, 
or the plaintiff owner in any copyright case involving a RFRA issue, would 
likely argue that protecting the translations, annotations, commentaries, and 
creative works included in scripture is a compelling interest that the court 
should uphold.  
 
As a matter of policy, the United States values innovation and the financial 
incentive to innovate. Christopher Yoo from Vanderbilt University law 
school succinctly describes the economic purpose for copyright law, 
“Nonrivalry is generally modeled by assuming that the marginal cost of 
making an additional copy of a copyrightable work is zero. These 
assumptions imply that markets provide insufficient incentives to produce 
copyrightable works and provide insufficient access to those works that are 
produced.”80 Professor Yoo goes on in this article to critique this 
conventional way of thinking about the policy behind copyright, but his 
description of the conventional thinking is the way that WCG would likely 
frame the issue. Without copyright protection, the market may allow a 
copycat writer with better marketing and more fame to copy a work verbatim 
and profit off the back of another writer.  
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We allow this free market structure for most industries because it incentivizes 
companies to put out better products, but it does not apply the same to 
copyright. The market cannot protect the years of work it takes an author to 
write a novel or the time spent by a musician writing the lyrics to a hit song. 
In this case, there is an additional wrinkle that the copyright owner no longer 
uses or believes in the work. This is tricky for the “exhaustion of demand” 
analysis because PCG could argue that the demand for a religious 
organization which follows the teachings of the MOA is a different market 
from that which WCG now seeks. The general understanding of the policy 
behind copyright is that we protect artists so that they are incentivized to 
create. To allow copyright infringement may not be as extreme a 
consequence as allowing, for example, human sacrifice in the name of 
religion, but both consequences would allow religious organizations to 
escape justice.  
 
On the other side, PCG and other parties in favor of overruling copyright law 
with RFRA would likely argue that protecting free exercise of faith is a more 
significant government interest than protecting the individual, personal gain 
interest. If these interests cannot align, then the infringing party would argue 
that the court should uphold free exercise interests over copyright law.  
 
The second prong of RFRA is that the furtherance of the compelling 
government interest must be the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.81 Putting aside the two parties for a moment, I believe that the least 
restrictive means of furthering both copyright law and religious free exercise 
is solved by enforcing the fair use doctrine. In the Worldwide case, PCG’s 
use would have been fair if it had just added its own commentary or 
annotations to the MOA.82 Fair use allows religious scripture to be copied as 
long as there is some original addition or difference in the new work. Asking 
the infringing or copying party to include or add commentary or some 
additional creative contribution to religious scripture is not a substantial 
burden on a person’s ability to practice their faith. PCG would likely counter 
by saying the text of the MOA is their core religious doctrine, and any 
modification would be against the intent of Herbert Armstrong. They may 
also argue that their use of the work is verbal, and their verbal teachings 
provide additional commentary that makes the use fair. A court may have to 
entangle itself in religious questions with this argument, because they would 
have to decide whether the verbal use was a “substantial” section of the 
original text.  
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PCG also argues that their audience is a different market than that of WCG, 
as they are trying to distance themselves from the “outdated” views written 
by Armstrong. Therefore, PCG would likely pass the fourth test of fair use 
without issue. 
 
Professor Thomas Berg suggests in his piece on this issue that a possible 
solution would be for a court to award damages but deny an injunction.83 This 
may be a less restrictive means of enforcing the interest of copyright law, but 
still comes with the problem of religious organizations believing that 
infringement amounts to misappropriation. Ultimately, the copyright holder 
should be the one to determine to whom they license the work. Refusing to 
issue an injunction may still result in harm to the potential market. This is 
especially relevant to religious organizations because recruitment and 
membership is generally more important to a congregation (as long as they 
can keep the doors open) than financial gain. WCG, for example, was making 
changes to their religious scripture because they wanted to manage the 
reputation of the church. If that scripture is still attached to WCG as the 
copyright owner and is being used elsewhere in a way they disapprove of, 
then damages cannot solve the issue. PCG may not advertise the fact that the 
MOA was originally owned and used by WCG, but it’s possible people may 
still associate the two together. This is more typical of a trademark dispute, 
but reputation of the copyright owner is still an important factor for the owner 
to consider in copyright use. Professor Berg’s solution may be better than 
nothing, but still does not satisfy significant concerns of the religious 
organization copyright holder. 
 
Whether RFRA invalidates the copyright doctrine in the case of religious 
disputes will likely continue to be a heavily-litigated issue. Until the Supreme 
Court has an opportunity to rule on this issue, circuit courts will also likely 
continue to dodge a precedential holding. 
 
B. Judicial Restraint in Religious Copyright Litigation 
 
The basic idea of judicial restraint is that judges should only comment or rule 
on issues where they have and are the proper authority. For example, this 
generally means that judges should not be activists in their decisions unless 
                                                                 
83
 Thomas C. Berg, Copying for Religious Reasons: A Comment on Principles of Copyright and 
Religious Freedom , 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 287, 317 (2003). 
2019]                      Copyright, Fair Use, and Religious Liberty                             81 
 
 
the law is clearly unconstitutional.84 Because most judges are appointed and 
not elected, citizens do not have an opportunity to vote out a judge because 
of a bad ruling. Citizens do, however, have the opportunity to remove 
members of Congress if they do not like the legislation the Congress member 
supports. The primary principle of judicial restraint is that even if a judge 
disagrees with the content of the suit or the consequences of a statute, they 
will not rule based on their personal views but rather on whether the 
Constitution has been violated or not.85 This principle is not practiced by all 
judges but is an important federalist value. 
 
Judicial restraint in free exercise litigation is crucial to uphold the ideals of 
federalism. Judges are not and should not be the source that Americans turn 
to when determining whether faith is based in fact or whether a particular 
religious practice is appropriate. On the other hand, we don’t want judges to 
allow injustices under the guise of a religious practice. This issue was raised 
all the way back in 1878 in the famous Reynolds v. U.S. by Chief Justice 
Waite:  
 
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of 
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil 
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a 
sacrifice? …To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines 
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.86 
 
 
This is, again, a more extreme version of the principle that we do not want to 
allow civil or criminal wrongdoings in the name of free religious exercise. In 
the case of religious copyright, while judges shouldn’t comment or rule on 
the truthfulness or factual/fictional nature of faith, they need to be able to 
determine whether use of religious scripture is fair. This tension isn’t always 
a difficult issue to overcome. Professor Thomas Berg commented on this 
issue, “A court could easily decide that the intention of a religious work was 
to convey spiritual information without determining whether the information 
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is true.”87 He cited a case involving the Church of Scientology where the 
Second Circuit concluded that Ron Hubbard’s works were informational, and 
therefore a biography quoting those works was more subject to a fair use 
defense.88 In these cases, judges need not practice judicial restraint if the 
court is not required to make judgments on the truthfulness or inherent 
goodness in a particular faith. 
 
It is important for judges to practice judicial restraint in cases where they 
must make a judgment on the truthfulness or factual nature of religious 
scripture when it is not clearly informational. Courts should generally avoid 
entanglements with religious pronouncements, but fair use litigation may 
require a court to listen to expert witnesses as to which part of the scripture 
is most significant and substantial. Luckily for most judges, it is usually clear 
if a scripture appears to try and persuade or rather merely conveys 
information. 
  
C. CONCLUSION 
 
The doctrine of fair use should be the solution to the conflict between RFRA 
or religious free exercise issues and copyright law. As highlighted by the 
Worldwide case in the Ninth Circuit, the infringing party has the opportunity 
to add original modifications to religious scripture including commentary, 
annotations, translations, or creative new additions. If the infringing party 
copies a religious text verbatim and there is no attempt to modify the 
protected work, then courts should hold that the infringing party is strictly 
liable as the Ninth Circuit did. 
 
In the same way that we do not want to allow human sacrifice under the shield 
of religion, we should not allow verbatim copying without some sort of 
original modification to religious scripture. Religious organizations are not 
substantially burdened by having to comment on or annotate their religious 
scripture and even if they were, fair use would pass the strict scrutiny test set 
out in RFRA. 
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